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Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge
Christoph Kelp∗
1. Many think that competent deduction is a way of extending one’s knowledge. In
particular, they think that the following captures this thought at least roughly:
Transmission-K. If (C1) one knows that p, (C2) one competently deduces q from
p, and (C3) one comes to believe that q based on one’s deduction, then (C4)
one thereby comes to know that q.1
Others disagree. They argue that cases like the following cause trouble for
Transmission-K:
Zebra. You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra enclo-
sure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside. Since you can
tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know the proposition that Z
= it is a zebra (C1). From this you competently deduce the proposition that
¬CDM = it is not a cleverly disguised mule (C2) and you thereupon come to
believe ¬CDM (C3) [Dretske 1970].
What foes of Transmission-K typically point out at this stage is that, intuitively,
your belief that ¬CDM does not qualify as knowledge. Given that this intuition is
correct, Transmission-K fails. After all, as the description of the case clearly indi-
cates, you satisfy all three conditions in the antecedent of the principle. However,
since you don’t know what you come to believe, you do not satisfy the consequent.
Even if it is intuitive that you do not come to know that ¬CDM in Zebra,
Transmission-K is also highly intuitive [e.g. Williamson 2000]. This raises the ques-
tion whether we should accept the counterexamples and reject Transmission-K or
else hold on to Transmission-K and embrace that agents in cases like Zebra do ac-
quire knowledge. One key aim of this paper is to argue that we should indeed reject
Transmission-K (§§2,3). Crucially, the argument I will offer is theoretical in the
sense that it relies on a number of independently plausible premises to establish the
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1 [Williamson 2000, Hawthorne 2004]. This principle also sometimes goes by the name of
Closure. In contrast with the debate on knowledge, the literature on warrant distinguishes sharply
between closure principles and transmission principles. Since the above would clearly be categorised
as a transmission principle there, I decided to go with the label Transmission-K.
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failure of Transmission-K, rather than just on the intuition of absence of knowledge
in cases like Zebra. What’s more, the argument also ushers the way toward carving
out a certain type of case in which Transmission-K fails (§4).
If Transmission-K fails, these failures should be borne out by the correct ac-
count of knowledge. The second aim of this paper is to argue that a certain kind
of virtue epistemological account of knowledge [e.g. Author 2013, 2016, Greco
2010, 2012, Sosa 2011, 2015] can do just that (§§5-8). To be more precise, I
will show that this kind of account has the resources to accommodate not only
that Transmission-K fails in the relevant type of case, but also that all remaining
instances of Transmission-K continue to hold. In this way, the virtue epistemolog-
ical account of knowledge not only bears out failures of Transmission-K but also
supports a suitably restricted version of the principle.
Finally, I will compare the virtue epistemological approach to Transmission-
K with the most prominent alternative, which explains failures of transmission in
terms of a sensitivity account of knowledge. I will argue that the virtue epistemo-
logical approach is preferable as only it can predict failures of transmission just
where it ought to (§§9-11).
2. This section offers an argument against Transmission-K. In order to achieve this,
I want to focus on inquiry and, more specifically, on inquiry into specific whether
questions.
Inquiry is a goal-directed activity. As such, it has a success condition, a condi-
tion under which its goal is attained. What is the goal of inquiry? Or, to be more
precise, what is the goal of an agent’s inquiry into whether p? One answer, which I
take to be platitudinous, is that one’s inquiry into whether p aims at properly settling
for oneself the question whether p (henceforth just settling the question whether p
for short).2 Correlatively, we get:
Inquiry Success. If one’s inquiry into whether p is successful, then it settles the
question whether p.
Another thesis that I take to be platitudinous is that question-begging excludes
question settling. This gives us:
No Settling. If one’s inquiry into whether p is question-begging, then it doesn’t
settle the question whether p.
Now consider the following two cases involving inquiry into whether ¬CDM:
Inquiry 1. You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside. Since you
2 Note that this fits nicely with Pamela Hieronymi’s view of belief that p as (positively) settling
for oneself the question whether p [Hieronymi 2009: 139], which will give us the independently
plausible result that the goal of inquiry is a species of belief. Note, however, that it does not follow
that belief is the goal of inquiry. After all, inquiry aims at properly settling for oneself the question
whether p, not just at settling it for oneself. Rather, what emerges is the attractive view that inquiry
aims at belief that is proper in some sense to be specified.
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can tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know that Z. You now want
to find out whether ¬CDM. To settle this question you take a hair sample from
the animal and perform a DNA analysis. The result of the analysis is that the
animal is indeed a zebra. From this, you competently deduce and thereupon
come to believe that ¬CDM.
Inquiry 2. You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside. Since you
can tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know that Z. You now want
to find out whether ¬CDM. To settle this question you exploit the entailment
from Z to ¬CDM to competently deduce and thereupon come to believe that
¬CDM.
There is a clear difference between Inquiry 1 and 2. While there is nothing wrong
with your inquiry in Inquiry 1, in Inquiry 2, your inquiry is problematic. What
explains this difference? The by far best answer that I can think of is that, in Inquiry
2, as opposed to 1, your inquiry is question-begging (more on this in §3 below).
Reflection on the difference between Inquiry 1 and 2 thus motivates the following
thesis:
Question-Begging. In Inquiry 2, your inquiry into whether ¬CDM is question-
begging.3
Now, one might wonder what all of these rather unexceptional points have to
do with Transmission-K. To see the answer, note that there is a relation between
knowledge and the goal of inquiry/success in inquiry. While inquiry into whether
p can platitudinously be characterised as aiming at settling the question whether p,
there is an ongoing debate over how one might characterise the goal of inquiry in
a more substantive fashion. There are a number live options in the literature: ac-
cording to some knowledge is the goal of inquiry [e.g. Author 2014, Millar 2011,
Williamson 2000], while others hold that it’s justified belief [e.g. Davidson 2005,
Feldman 2002, Rorty 1995] or true belief [e.g. Kvanvig 2003, Lynch 2005]. For-
tunately, for present purposes, the issue doesn’t have to be decided. The reason
for this is that knowledge entails justified true belief. Given that all live candidates
for the goal of inquiry are entailed by knowledge, there is reason to believe that
knowledge is at least sufficient for attaining success in inquiry. In other words,
Knowledge Sufficiency. If one’s inquiry into whether p leads one to knowledge
that p (not-p), then one’s inquiry into whether p is successful.
It is easy to see that from Inquiry Success, Question-Begging, No Settling and
Knowledge Sufficiency, it follows that, in Inquiry 2, your inquiry into ¬CDM does
not lead you to knowledge that¬CDM. But now recall how your inquiry in Inquiry 2
3 It may be worth noting that even champions of Transmission-K and the related transmission of
warrant principle (see §3 below) acknowledge this point [e.g. Pryor 2000, Markie 2005, Pritchard
2007].
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proceeds: from Z, which you know, you competently deduce and thereupon come to
believe that ¬CDM. If Transmission-K holds, your inquiry leads you to knowledge
that ¬CDM. Hence, Transmission-K fails.4
Crucially, however, this failure is not just supported by an intuition that you
do not know that ¬CDM. Rather, we have an independent theoretical argument for
this which exploits a couple of platitudinous principles relating the goal of inquiry,
question-begging and question-settling, an independently plausible principle relat-
ing knowledge and the goal of inquiry, and a highly attractive explanation of a clear
difference between Inquiry 1 and 2 in terms of question-begging.
3. Reflection on the structure of question-settling serves to further support this
result. To see how, note first that there is a lively and related debate in the literature
on whether the following principle holds:
Transmission-W. If one has warrant for p and one competently deduces q from p,
then one thereby has warrant for q.
One interesting fact that this debate has unearthed is that the division on Transmission-
W is driven by a disagreement about the structure of warrant [Pryor 2004]. In par-
ticular, we can distinguish between three relevant views: Conservatism [e.g. Wright
2004, 2007, White 2006], Moderatism [e.g. Coliva 2012, 2015] and Liberalism [e.g.
Pryor 2000, 2004, Davis 2009]. In the case of perceptual warrants these views dis-
agree about the status of propositions like ¬CDM for acquiring warrant for proposi-
tions like Z by perceptual means. Conservatives claim that you need an antecedent
warrant for propositions like ¬CDM. Moderates claim that, while such proposi-
tions need not be antecedently warranted, they must be antecedently assumed in
some sense to be specified. In contrast, liberals disagree with both: they deny
that propositions like ¬CDM need be antecedently warranted or assumed. They do
grant, however, that they have the potential to defeat one’s warrant for propositions
4 Here is a more detailed statement of the argument:
1. Transmission-K holds. [Assumption for RAA]
2. In Inquiry 2, you know that Z, competently deduce ¬CDM from Z and thereupon come to
believe that ¬CDM. [Description of Inquiry 2]
3. In Inquiry 2, you come to know that ¬CDM. [1,2]
4. In Inquiry 2, your inquiry into whether ¬CDM is question-begging. [Question-Begging]
5. In Inquiry 2, your inquiry into whether ¬CDM doesn’t settle the question whether ¬CDM.
[4, No Settling]
6. In Inquiry 2, your inquiry into whether ¬CDM is not successful. [5, Inquiry Success]
7. In Inquiry 2, your inquiry into ¬CDM doesn’t lead you to knowledge that ¬CDM, i.e. you
don’t come to know that ¬CDM. [6, Knowledge Sufficiency]
8. ⊥ [3,7]
9. Transmission-K does not hold. [1,8]
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like Z. However, they will do so only in special circumstances such as when one
has reason to think that ¬CDM is true.
Here is how this division bears on the question of Transmission-W. Conser-
vatism and Moderatism license failures of Transmission-W. In Zebra, for instance,
they hold that ¬CDM must already be in place (as either antecedently warranted
or assumed) for perceptual means to generate a warrant for Z. As a result, when
you reason from Z to ¬CDM you effectively fall foul of circular reasoning. Since
circular reasoning cannot confer warrant on its conclusion, warrant fails to transmit
from Z to ¬CDM. In contrast, Liberalism does not require ¬CDM to be in place
in any way for you to acquire a warrant for Z by perceptual means. As a result,
the inference from Z to ¬CDM will not come out as circular either and is perfectly
suited to transmit warrant to the conclusion.
Let’s now consider the structure of question-settling. We can easily enough
imagine the following analogues to Conservatism, Moderatism and Liberalism about
the structure of warrant, which I will label Q-Conservatism, Q-Moderatism and Q-
Liberalism respectively. Q-Conservatism claims that in order to settle the question
whether Z by perceptual means, for instance, you need to already have settled the
question whether ¬CDM. Q-Moderatism claims that that’s too much. All that’s
needed is that ¬CDM is already true. Q-Liberalism takes not even this to be re-
quired. You can settle the question whether Z by perceptual means whether or not
¬CDM has already been settled or whether or not it is already true.
The crucial point is that it is highly plausible that Q-Moderatism is true of the
structure of question-settling. Certain facts must already be in place for you to be
able to settle the question whether Z by perceptual means. For instance, when you
are in a part of the world that is predominantly populated with cleverly disguised
mules, when the animal before you is a cleverly disguised mule, etc., you cannot
settle the question whether Z just by looking. That’s why Q-Moderatism is true
rather than Q-Liberalism. At the same time, in order to settle the question whether
Z by looking you don’t have to already have settled the question of whether the
relevant facts are indeed in place. You do not need to already have settled the
question of whether you are in cleverly disguised mule county, whether ¬CDM,
etc. That would be much too demanding. In fact, if such a requirement were in
place, it is hard to see how we could ever settle any question at all. That’s why
Q-Moderatism is true rather Q-Conservatism.
Given that Moderatism licenses transmission of warrant failures, it should now
come as no surprise that question-settling is not transmissive either. In fact, the
reason for this is parallel in both cases. Recall that, according to Moderatism, per-
ceptual means will give you a warrant for Z only if ¬CDM is assumed. That’s why
when you deduce ¬CDM from Z you fall foul of circular reasoning. Warrant fails
to transmit across your deduction. Similarly, settling the question whether Z by
looking requires that you are not in disguised mule county, that ¬CDM, etc. When,
having settled Z by looking, you move on to settle the question whether ¬CDM by
deduction from it being a zebra, you fail in a similar way: you fall foul of begging
the question. The property of question-settling fails to transmit across the deduction
5
as well.
But, of course, given that knowledge is sufficient for question-settling, this
means that in cases in which the property of question-settling fails to transmit across
competent deduction, you don’t come to know the conclusion of the deduction.
Given that, in some such cases (e.g. Inquiry 2), it is independently plausible that
you know the premise and that you believe the conclusion based on competent de-
duction from the premise, this means that Transmission-K is bound to fail. In this
way, the argument against Transmission-K receives further support by reflecting on
the structure of question-settling.
4. Before moving on, I’d like to point out that we also have what it takes to specify a
certain type of case in which Transmission-K fails due to question-begging. To see
this, note that the reason why, in Inquiry 2, your inquiry into whether ¬CDM begs
the question generalises. If Q-Moderatism is true, settling the question whether p in
way W p will typically (if not invariably) require that a certain set of facts ∆W p are
already in place.5 Anyone who then ventures to settle any further question whether
q by deducing, say, q from p, where q corresponds to some i ∈ ∆W p will fall foul of
question-begging. If, in addition, one knows that p by having settled the question
whether p in W p and has come to believe q by competent deduction from p, we
will have a case of Transmission-K failure due to question-begging. We thus have a
type of case in which Transmission-K fails due to question-begging. It is this type
of case (henceforth The Case) that I will focus on in the remainder of this paper.6
5. With the argument against Transmission-K in play, I will now turn to virtue
epistemological accounts of knowledge. Recall that my aim here is to show that
such accounts have the resources to accommodate not only that Transmission-K fails
in the relevant type of case, but also that all remaining instances of Transmission-K
continue to hold. First things first, however, I will now sketch the key elements of
VE’s account of knowledge.
First, VE accepts an account of the normativity of performances with an aim
according to which such performances can be assessed along three dimensions:
1. Success. Does the performance attain its aim?
2. Competence. Is the performance produced by the exercise of an ability to
attain the aim?
3. Aptness. Is the performance successful because competent?
Second, the relevant notions of ability, its exercise, competent and apt perfor-
mances are unpacked. Here are rough versions of my own preferred way of doing
this [Author 2016]:
5 While I will not discuss the question as to what’s in ∆W p in any detail here, fn.8 indicates how
I aim to tackle the issue.
6 There may be other kinds of case in which Transmission-K fails, perhaps even due to question-
begging. While this may mean that the account of Transmission-K failure is not complete, it does
not diminish its significance. After all, understanding only one such kind of case means important
progress on the issue.
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Abilities. An ability is a way of producing performances that disposes its possessor
to attain successes in a certain range when exercised in a set, ΓA, of suitably
favourable conditions.
Exercises of Abilities. An exercise of an ability is a use of the way of producing
performances at issue in it.
Competent Performances. A competent performance is a performance that is pro-
duced by an exercise of an ability such that the target success is within the
range of the ability exercised.
Apt Performances. An apt performance is a successful and competent performance
in ΓA.
On this view, abilities are intrinsically connected to success by the relevant dispo-
sitions. However, the strength of the success-connection may vary in a number of
ways. For instane, there may be variation in the probability of success conditional
on the exercise of ability in ΓA. The thought here is that the higher the probability of
success given the exercise of ability in ΓA, the stronger the ability (relative to ΓA).
Most importantly for present purposes, the strongest abilities (relative to ΓA) feature
surefire dispositions, i.e. dispositions such that the exercise of ability in ΓA guar-
antees success. As a result, for abilities featuring surefire dispositions, competent
performances in ΓA entail successes.
Third, VE takes belief to be one kind of performance with an aim. To be more
precise, belief is taken to be a kind of performance with a distinctively epistemic
aim.7 Accordingly, the account of the normativity of performances applies to belief.
Beliefs can be assessed as successful, competent, and apt.
Fourth, VE identifies different core epistemic properties with different norma-
tive properties of beliefs as epistemic performances. Most importantly for present
purposes, VE identifies justified belief with competent belief and knowledge with
apt belief:
VE-JB. One justifiably believes that p if and only if one competently believes that
p.
VE-K. One knows that p if and only if one aptly believes that p.
6. My task is to show that VE bears out failures of Transmission-K in The Case
and that it can license instances of Transmission-K in all other cases. In order to
achieve this, I will first argue that, given certain assumptions, VE validates an un-
restricted version of Transmission-K. This establishes that VE can license instances
of Transmission-K, including the target ones. Then I will show how champions of
VE can replace the assumptions that commit them to Transmission-K in such a way
7 Standardly, this aim is taken to be truth. However, alternatives have also been defended. My
own preferred view takes the aim of belief to be knowledge [Author 2016]. Here I want to stay
neutral on this issue.
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that Transmission-K fails just in The Case. In this way, VE supports just the kind of
restricted version of Transmission-K we are after.
To begin with, consider the following bridge principles between Transmission-K
and VE-K:
Bridge 1. [C2] and [C3] hold if and only if one believes that q via the exercise of
a deductive epistemic ability (DEAq).
Bridge 2. [C1] identifies a member of ΓDEAq.
Now consider the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The disposition at issue in DEAq is a surefire disposition.
Assumption 2. There are no other members of ΓDEAq besides [C1].
Assumption 3. The range of DEAq includes all propositions q one may compe-
tently deduce from p.
VE’s framework for the normativity of performances, VE-K, Bridge 1 and 2, and
Assumption 1 – 3 jointly entail (and thus validate) Transmission-K. Here’s why.
To begin with, by Bridge 1, Assumption 3 and Competent Performance, if [C2]
and [C3] hold, then one will competently believe that q. Next, by Bridge 2 and
Assumption 2, [C1] specifies the only members ΓDEAq. Hence, if [C1] holds, the
set of conditions to which DEAq is relative must be satisfied. Hence, if [C1] –
[C3] hold, then one must also competently believe that q in ΓDEAq. But now recall
that for any ability featuring a surefire disposition, competent performance in ΓA
entails success. Since, by Assumption 1, the disposition at issue in DEA is a surefire
disposition, it follows that if [C1] – [C3] hold, then one must not only competently
believe that q in ΓDEAq but one’s belief that q must also be successful. Thus, by Apt
Performance, if [C1] – [C3] hold, one’s belief that q is apt. By VE-K, it follows that
it qualifies as knowledge, i.e. [C4] holds. Given VE’s framework for the normativity
of performances, VE-K, Bridge 1 and 2, and Assumption 1 – 3, we get the result
that if [C1] – [C3] hold, then [C4] must hold also. Transmission-K is thus validated.
7. Next, I will show how to accommodate failures of Transmission-K in and just in
The Case. Of course, in order to deny Transmission-K, champions of VE must block
the validation argument from §6. That means that they will have to resist at least
one of the bridge principles or assumptions the argument exploits. At the same time,
wherever they may place their resistance, they had better made sure that they do not
thereby close the door to explaining that the remaining instances of Transmission-K
do hold. It is easy to see that this means that the bridge principles are off limits. And
the same goes for Assumption 1. After all, it is needed to ensure that the satisfaction
of [C1] – [C3] guarantees the satisfaction of [C4] even for uncontentious instances
of Transmission-K. This leaves Assumption 2 and 3. As I am about to argue, both
options can be made to work.
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The first and most important step is to connect ∆W p with VE-K. To see how
this can be done, recall that, in the argument against Transmission-K, I pointed out
that it is uncontentious that knowledge is sufficient for success in inquiry. I also
indicated that I have argued elsewhere [Author 2014] that knowledge is not only
sufficient but also necessary for success in inquiry. If I am right about this—as,
due to limitations of space, I will simply have to assume that I am—and given
the plausible assumption that question-settling is also not only sufficient but also
necessary for success in inquiry, we get the result that one has settled the question
whether p if and only if one aptly believes that p/not-p. But in that case, it is
immensely plausible that the way of settling the question whether p referred to
in The Case, just is an epistemic ability that has p in its range at issue in VE-K.
In other words, it is immensely plausible that W p = EAp. Moreover, it is also
immensely plausible that the set of facts that Q-Moderatism requires to be in place
for the question whether p to be settled will just be the set of conditions to which
the epistemic ability is relative. In other words, it is also immensely plausible that
∆W p = ΓEAp.8 Given that this is so, we can describe The Case in terms of the
conceptual resources of VE: (i) one knows that p via the exercise of an epistemic
ability, EAp that requires ΓEAp to be in place, (ii) one has come to believe that q via
the exercise of a deductive epistemic ability, DEA, and (iii) q corresponds to some
i ∈ ΓEAp.
With The Case so described, here’s what champions of VE need to do to accom-
modate the relevant failures of Transmission-K: they need to disallow instances of
Transmission-K for any q such that q corresponds to some i ∈ ΓEAp. It is not hard
to see that there are two ways of achieving this, each corresponding to the denial
of one of Assumption 2 and 3. First, pace Assumption 2, champions of VE may
maintain that, in addition to one’s knowing the premise of one’s deduction, a fur-
ther member of ΓDEAq is that q not correspond to any i ∈ ΓEAp. Alternatively, pace
Assumption 3, they may hold that the range of DEAq includes only propositions q
such that q does not correspond to any i ∈ ΓEAp, alongside the requirement that one
may competently deduce q from p of course. It is easy to see that (i) either option
will accommodate the failure of Transmission-K in The Case, whilst (ii) continuing
to allow instances of Transmission-K to hold in all other cases.
8. Does it matter which alternative we opt for? Yes. There is a crucial difference
between the two approaches. To see this, let’s consider once again the first option,
which denies Assumption 2 and holds on to Assumption 3. On this approach, while
the belief in the conclusion of the deduction falls short of knowledge, it continues to
be justified. The reason for this is that, by Bridge 1, one’s belief that q is produced
by the exercise of DEAq and, by Assumption 3, q is within the range of this ability.
It follows from Competent Belief that one’s belief in q is competent and by VE-JB
that it is justified.
In contrast, on the alternative approach, the conclusion belief qualifies as neither
8 In fact, ∆W p = ΓEAp promises to offer a more systematic account of what’s in ∆W p. See [Author
2016] for more on how to determine what’s in ΓEAp.
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knowledge nor justified. Recall that, here we restrict the range of DEAq to include
only propositions q such that one may competently deduce q from p and q does not
correspond to any i∈ΓEAp. For any q that corresponds to some i∈ΓEAp, then, while
by Bridge 1, one’s belief that q may well be produced by the exercise of DEAq, it
will not be in the range of this ability. By Competent Belief it is not competent and,
by VE-JB, it is not justified.
Finally, it strikes me as highly plausible that, in The Case, the deductive infer-
ence not only fails to transmit knowledge, but also justified belief. For instance,
when in Inquiry 2, you come to believe ¬CDM by competent deduction from Z,
the question-begging character of your inquiry not only prevents you from coming
to know ¬CDM, but also from coming to believe it justifiably. As a result, I take
the second option, which places further restrictions on the range of DEAq, to be
preferable. This completes the virtue epistemological account of Transmission-K
failure I favour.
9. VE is not the only view in the literature that licences failures of Transmission-
K. Most famously, sensitivity accounts of knowledge do so, too. Very roughly,
according to sensitivity accounts, one knows that p if and only if one sensitively
believes that p [Dretske 1970, Nozick 1981]. And, again very roughly, one’s belief
that p is sensitive if and only if at the closest worlds at which p false, one does not
believe p.
It’s easy to see that Transmission-K will fail on sensitivity accounts. Just con-
sider Zebra once more. Your belief that Z is sensitive: at the closest worlds at which
Z false, the enclosure would be empty or you would be standing in front of a differ-
ent enclosure in which case you’d be looking at some other kind of animal instead.
In that case, you would not believe that Z. Since your belief that Z is sensitive, sensi-
tivity accounts will predict that you know Z. Now suppose you competently deduce
and thereupon come to believe that ¬CDM. Is that belief sensitive as well? No.
After all, at the closest worlds at which ¬CDM false, you’d be looking at a cleverly
disguised mule, in which case you’d still believe ¬CDM (based on your competent
deduction from Z). Since your belief that ¬CDM isn’t sensitive, sensitivity accounts
will predict that you don’t know ¬CDM. Transmission-K fails.
10. What’s the relation between the VE approach to Transmission-K and the sensi-
tivity approach? In particular, is there any reason to favour one over the other? As
I am about to argue, the answer to this question is yes. What’s more, fortunately,
there is reason to think that the VE approach is the better one.
To see why, consider first the following case:
Inquiry 3. You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside. Since you
can tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know that Z. You now
want to find out whether ¬CDM. In order to achieve this, you first exploit the
equivalence between Z and Z & ¬CDM to competently deduce Z & ¬CDM
and then apply conjunction elimination to arrive at the belief that ¬CDM
[Hawthorne 2004].
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It’s easy to see that the argument from §§2,3 that knowledge fails to transmit across
competent deduction in Inquiry 2 serves to establish the same result for Inquiry 3.9
It’s also easy to see that sensitivity accounts can secure this result. After all, your
belief that ¬CDM is no more sensitive here than in the earlier Inquiry 2. Hence,
you don’t know ¬CDM here either. So far, so good.
Of course, if knowledge fails to transmit in Inquiry 3, we’d expect it to do so at
some specific point in your deduction, i.e. either when you deduce Z & ¬CDM from
Z or when you deduce ¬CDM from Z & ¬CDM. The question is where exactly this
point is. Say you are convinced that Transmission-K fails in cases like Inquiry 2 in
which your competent deduction exploits the entailment from Z to ¬CDM. If so,
you will want to say that, in Inquiry 3, knowledge fails to transmit at the first step
of the deduction, which exploits the equivalence between Z and Z & ¬CDM. There
are at least three reasons for this. First, it seems independently plausible that if you
cannot come to know that ¬CDM via competent deduction from known Z, then the
same goes for Z & ¬CDM. Second (and relatedly), ¬CDM is logically weaker than
Z & ¬CDM. As a result, if knowledge doesn’t transmit across competent deduc-
tion to ¬CDM, then it would be at least surprising if it did transmit to the stronger
Z & ¬CDM. Third, the thesis that knowledge is closed under competent conjunc-
tion elimination is extremely plausible. Already the stronger principle that if one
knows a conjunction, then one knows each conjunct is nearly universally accepted.
Rejecting this principle will just be too large of a bullet to bite.
The problem for sensitivity theorists is that they are committed to holding that
the deduction fails to transmit at the conjunction elimination step, rather than at the
step that exploits the equivalence. The reason for this is that if your belief that Z is
sensitive, then so is your belief that Z & ¬CDM arrived at via competent deduction.
After all, the closest worlds at which Z & ¬CDM is false are just the worlds at
which Z is false. According to sensitivity accounts, then, if you know Z and come
to believe that Z & ¬CDM via competent deduction from Z, then you also know
that Z & ¬CDM. Sensitivity accounts predict that knowledge does transmit across
competent deductions that exploit the equivalence between Z and Z & ¬CDM. So,
the problem must lie with the conjunction elimination step. And that’s the wrong
result.
11. Can the VE approach do better? As a first observation, note that the VE ap-
proach does not entail anything about which of the two steps in Inquiry 3 is the
problematic one. It only tells us that knowledge does not transmit from Z to ¬CDM
and hence that at least one step must be problematic. On the upside, this means that
the VE approach is at least compatible with the right result here. At the same time,
it would be nice to be able to do more than this, i.e. to secure the correct result rather
than merely being compatible with it. Fortunately, this can be done also. Here is
how.
9 This is unsurprising once it is noted that the only difference between Inquiry 2 and Inquiry
3 is that the competent deduction of ¬CDM from Z proceeds via a different route and the above
argument simply doesn’t depend on the specific route of deduction.
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First, the above VE approach only specifies a set of propositions such that
knowledge doesn’t transmit across competent deduction to members of this set.
While this is too coarse-grained for specifying which step in a multi-step deduction
is the problematic one, it is all we need when we are dealing with one-step deduc-
tions. After all, if the deduction features only one step, then it’s clear exactly where
transmission failure occurs. For instance, in Inquiry 2, the deduction proceeds in
a single step, which exploits the entailment from Z to ¬CDM. Here, it’s clear that
this is where transmission failure occurs.
While it would be nice to have a fully general account of just where knowl-
edge fails to transmit in multi-step deductions, I must confess that I don’t have one.
However, I have the following proposal for a partial account:
Transmission Failure. If knowledge fails to transmit across a competent deduction
that exploits a certain logical relationship between the members of a certain
set of propositions, then it also fails to transmit across any competent de-
duction that exploits an a priori equivalent logical relationship between the
members of this set.
For instance, if knowledge fails to transmit across any competent deduction that ex-
ploits the entailment from p to q, then it also fails to transmit across any competent
deduction that exploits a logical relationship a priori equivalent to the entailment
from p to q. This much seems plausible enough.
Now, we have already seen that knowledge fails to transmit from competent de-
duction from Z to ¬CDM in Inquiry 2. We have also seen that, in Inquiry 2, the
deduction is a one-step deduction, which exploits the entailment from Z to ¬CDM.
This means that the deduction fails at the step that exploits the entailment. Crucially,
the entailment from Z to ¬CDM is a priori equivalent to the equivalence between Z
and Z & ¬CDM, i.e. (Z→ ¬CDM) ≡ (Z ≡ (Z & ¬CDM)). By Transmission Fail-
ure, it follows that knowledge fails to transmit across any competent deduction that
exploits the equivalence between Z and Z & ¬CDM. In this way, the VE approach
can secure the desired result.
12. In this paper I have done three things. First, I have mounted a case against
Transmission-K, which not only provided theoretical reason to believe that this prin-
ciple is false but also specified a certain type of case in which it fails. Second, I
have shown that champions of a certain type of virtue epistemological account of
knowledge can countenance a suitably restricted version of Transmission-K, which
licences failures of transmission in the problematic type of case, whilst allowing
for knowledge to transmit in all other cases. Finally, third, I have compared this
virtue epistemological approach to the most prominent competitor in the literature,
which explains transmission failures in terms of a sensitivity account of knowledge.
I have argued that the virtue epistemological approach is favourable as only it can
pin failures of Transmission-K to the right step in all relevant cases. This paper
has thus brought good news for deniers of Transmission-K whom it provides with
further support for their view as well as for virtue epistemologists who can success-
12
fully solve another difficult epistemological problem and score points against the
competition.
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